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The Proposed Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States: Treaties—Some 
Serious Procedural and Substantive Concerns 
Leila Nadya Sadat* 
INTRODUCTION 
The drafting of a new Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign 
Relations Law was proposed to the American Law Institute (ALI) in 
2012, and the project is now well under way. Multiple preliminary 
drafts have been circulated on the topics of Jurisdiction, Sovereign 
Immunity, and Treaties, and discussion has begun amongst ALI 
Members about the black letter law and commentary they contain. 
Because the ultimate adoption of any provisions by the membership of 
the ALI will take time, however, and is certainly not a foregone 
conclusion, it remains useful to consider at this relatively early stage 
whether the project has been well-conceived, and is on the right track. 
This Essay will consider the most recent Discussion Draft of April 
2015 on the Status of Treaties in United States Law,1 and not the 
tentative drafts on Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity. This brief 
examination of the Treaty Draft raises real questions about both the 
scope and execution of the Restatement (Fourth) project more 
generally. Particularly worrying is the reporters’ decision not to 
begin the project with a comprehensive outline of the provisions 
they intend to cover, a process issue magnified by some substantive 
concerns raised by the content of the proposed Black Letter Law, 
Comments, and Reporters’ Notes, many of which are addressed in 
other contributions to this Symposium. The present Essay focuses 
 
∗ Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law; Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, 
Washington University School of Law; Special Adviser on Crimes Against Humanity to the 
ICC Prosecutor [sadat@wulaw.wustl.edu]. I would like to thank the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School at Brigham Young University for the invitation to participate in this Symposium and am 
grateful to my colleagues at Washington University School of Law for their helpful comments 
and input, particularly Susan Appleton, Stephen Legomsky, Greg Magarian, Adam 
Rosenzweig, and Peggie Smith. This essay represents the personal views of the author and does 
not represent the official views of any organ of the International Criminal Court. 
 1.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES §§ 101–106 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015). 
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more upon the structure and probable impact of the project than the 
substance of the text, but does question certain substantive choices 
made by the drafters, as well as their overall normative approach. 
This Essay suggests that it would have been preferable for the 
reporters to develop an outline of the entire project before 
attempting to draft sections piecemeal. This would render the final 
project, and even sections completed along the way, both more 
complete and authoritative and would promote greater transparency 
about the project as a whole. It could also help in understanding the 
relationship between the Restatements (Third) and (Fourth) for the 
time period during which they will overlap. This Essay concludes, 
perhaps uncomfortably, that if the reporters are unable to do this, 
they should reconsider whether it is appropriate to be engaged in the 
project at all. 
In terms of specific comments, this Essay questions the Discussion 
Draft’s narrow scope, and suggests a return to the unitary structure of 
Section 111 of the Restatement (Third), rather than the fragmented 
approach of the current initiative, which has separated Article II treaties 
from all other forms of international law. Because other contributions to 
this volume have taken up in detail the discussion of Section 106 (Self-
Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Provisions), this Essay does 
not address that issue, although many of the critiques raised in those 
contributions echo some of my own concerns.2 
I. HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH) PROJECT 
In 1987, the American Law Institute published the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.3 This two-
volume work was the successor to the 1965 Restatement, and its 
Chief Reporter was the late Louis Henkin of Columbia University, 
who was assisted by Andreas Lowenfeld, Louis Sohn, and Detlev 
Vagts as additional Reporters.4 The Restatement (Third) is divided 
into nine Parts, some of which address questions of international law, 
 
 2.  See, e.g., David Sloss, Self-Execution in the Restatement (Fourth) on Treaties, 2015 
BYU L. REV. 1691 (2016) (arguing that the Reporters have endorsed a novel version of the 
doctrine of self-execution that finds little support in current law). 
 3.  Because of a quirk in the labeling of ALI Restatements, the first Restatement of 
foreign relations law was actually labeled the second, and the fourth is therefore actually the third. 
 4.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
ix (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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others the relationship of international law to U.S. law, and still 
others address questions of U.S. domestic law, and more particularly 
U.S. Constitutional law. As Geoffrey Hazard, Director of the ALI at 
the time of the Restatement (Third)’s publication, noted, many 
questions of U.S. foreign relations law raise constitutional questions 
involving the independence of the judiciary, “the separation of 
powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, the 
special constitutional role of the Senate with respect to treaties, and 
the federal structure of government.”5 The Parts addressing 
international law questions cover the status of persons, including 
recognition of states and governments, succession of states and 
international organizations (Part II), the making and scope of 
international agreements (Part III), jurisdiction (which also includes 
immunities, international cooperation and foreign judgments and 
awards) (Part IV), the law of the sea (Part V), the law of the 
environment (Part VI), protection of natural and juridical persons, 
including human rights law and injury to aliens (Part VII), 
international economic relations, covering international trade and 
monetary law (Part VIII), and remedies for violations of 
international law (Part IX). As completed, the Restatement (Third) 
represents the opinion of the ALI as to “the law as it would be 
pronounced by a disinterested tribunal, whether of the United States 
or some other national state or an international tribunal.”6 
The Restatement (Third) took six years to draft in its entirety.7 It 
was generally well-received when it was published, although it was 
not without its critics.8 According to one observer, controversy 
centered largely around the “treatment of customary international 
law, expropriation, extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and the act 
of state doctrine.”9 It was broken into five separate tentative drafts, 
and because it became very difficult to envisage what the final 
product would resemble, the ABA Section on International Law 
 
 5.  Id. at x.  
 6.  Id. at xi. 
 7.  It was begun in 1978. See John B. Houck, Restatement of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States (Revised): Issues and Resolutions, 20 INT’L LAW. 1361, 1361 (1986). 
See generally Covey T. Oliver, Foreword, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1984). Houck’s essay is 
particularly helpful in describing the scope of the disagreements engendered by the draft 
documents and the process followed in resolving the disputes. 
 8.  Oliver, supra note 7, at 1–5. 
 9.  Houck, supra note 7, at 1363. 
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persuaded, with the help of other interested parties including the 
State Department, the ALI to publish a complete new composite 
draft in July 1985, which was open for comment until December 
2nd. The final draft was brought to the ALI for a final vote by the 
Membership in July 1986.10 
The interactive and broad consultations conceded to by the ALI 
and the reporters for the Restatement (Third) appear to have 
produced an effective compromise text that enjoyed wide support. A 
contemporaneous review in the American Journal of International 
Law praised the final product as an “extremely important and useful 
publication” that “should and will be consulted by lawyers in all 
parts of the world.”11 Another reviewer opined that “the new 
Restatement . . . has quickly . . . established a position of paramount 
influence, not only on the application of international law by 
domestic organs of the United States, but also as a cognitive source 
of international law, in general.”12 
Particularly helpful, from an international perspective, was the 
reference to comparative law sources in the reporters’ notes and 
comments, and their effort to effectively address the interplay of 
international law and domestic rules.13 
The reviewers’ predictions were correct: the Restatement (Third) 
has been relied upon extensively by U.S., international, and foreign 
courts and experts wishing to know what the law is in a particular 
area of international law, or regarding the treatment of international 
law by the U.S. legal system. According to one author, as of 2010, 
the Restatement had been cited by the United States Supreme Court 
twenty-two times since it was published and has been cited with 
increasing frequency in recent years, especially in “landmark 
international law cases”14 like Sosa,15 Sanchez Llamas,16 Boumediene,17 
 
 10.  Id. at 1364. 
 11.  Rudolf Bernhardt et al., Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 608, 609 (1992) 
(reviewing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987)). 
 12.  Matthias Herdegan, Book Review, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 207, 207 (1991) (reviewing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987)). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Oona Hathaway, Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law School, Remarks at American 
Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2010), in 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 301, 312 (2010). 
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and Medellín.18 More recently the Court cited it in Kiobel,19 Bond,20 
and most recently in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.21 
So why a new Restatement, given the authority and popularity of 
the existing two-volume work? The idea was floated by a handful of 
prominent scholars and then discussed more broadly as more 
individuals became involved. Paul Stephan, one of the Co-Reporters 
of the current project, criticized the Restatement (Third) in a major 
article published in 2003, in which he suggested that the 
Restatement’s view on the status of international law as federal law 
was no longer appropriate in a post-September 11th world.22 It was 
debated at a panel convened by the American Society of 
International Law in 2010, during which some scholars proposed 
 
 15.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004) (using the Restatement as a 
baseline for human rights violations with regards to detention); see also id. at 761–62 (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (suggesting “that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set 
of norms is consistent with principles of international comity”). 
 16.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006) (“An international 
agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987))). But see id. passim (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that treaties may 
create enforceable rights). 
 17.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (quoting Restatement § 206 in 
order to establish a definition for sovereignty). 
 18.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 (2008) (referencing § 481, comment b, at 
595, of the Restatement to argue that foreign judgments awarding injunctive relief “are not 
generally entitled to enforcement”); see also id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Restatement calls “for recognition of judgment rendered after fair hearing in a contested 
proceeding before a court with adjudicatory authority over the case”). 
 19.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670–78 (2013) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (using Restatement §§ 402–404 to argue against the presumption 
against extraterritoriality). 
 20.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(disagreeing with the broad treaty powers under the Restatement); see also id. at 2103 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (contesting the Restatement’s failure to recognize the federal limit 
placed on the Treaty Power). 
 21.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084, 2087 (2015) (“Under the Constitution 
of the United States the President has exclusive authority to recognize or not to recognize a 
foreign state or government.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1987))). 
 22.  Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law: The 
Intellectual Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 33, 60–62 (2003). 
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“updating” certain parts of the Restatement,23 whereas others 
suggested that a new Restatement was premature. Oona Hathaway, 
who did not favor moving forward, noted that even though it was 
getting old, the Restatement (Third) was still widely cited and 
viewed as authoritative, and that any new Restatement would be 
obliging the ALI to “choose sides on contested points” given the 
highly unsettled state of the law.24 Jide Nzelibe agreed with 
Hathaway, but for different reasons: as he noted, the need for “black 
letter” rules in public law, rather than “private law” fields seemed 
doubtful.25 He agreed with Hathaway that there were “battle lines” 
and a lot of “splits” that would have to be openly acknowledged in 
the text and the commentary in order to note the areas of 
disagreement, as well as consensus.26 Barry Carter and David Stewart 
argued for a narrow update in the area of jurisdiction, immunities 
and related issues, which they felt could be a project that could and 
should be taken up. Their paper suggests that the ALI approach this 
as a “project” which could have been taken up either as a set of 
principles or as an update to the Restatement (Third).27 It is perhaps 
worth noting that international commercial arbitration now has its 
own Restatement of the Law, which was published in 2015, to cover 
new advances in that field.28 
In 2012, picking up on Stewart and Carter’s suggestion, 
Professors Paul Stephan and Sarah Cleveland proposed that the ALI 
embark upon a new Restatement on Foreign Relations Law.29 Unlike 
 
 23.  David Stewart and Barry Carter proposed a “narrow” update; Oona Hathaway and 
Jide Nzelibe suggested that updating the Restatement was premature and “a very fraught 
enterprise.” Panel, Updating the Restatement, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 301, 313 (2010). 
 24.  Id. at 312. 
 25.  Id. at 313–14. Nzelibe has a point: most ALI Restatements cover classic private law 
areas—contracts, torts, agency, etc.—and it has never to the knowledge of this writer been 
suggested that the ALI take on constitutional law as the subject of a Restatement. Given that 
foreign relations law is a subset, in part, of U.S. Constitutional law, preparing a Restatement 
on the subject is perhaps inherently tendentious, given the often unsettled nature of the law. I 
am grateful to my colleague Greg Magarian for making this point as well. 
 26.  Id. at 315. 
 27.  Id. at 307. 
 28.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 29.  Proposal from Lance Liebman, Dir. of Am. Law Inst., to Am. Law Inst. Council 
(2012) (on file with author) (submitting for council approval a proposal for a Restatement 
(Fourth) authored by Paul B. Stephan III and Sarah H. Cleveland) [hereinafter Stephan-
Cleveland Proposal]. 
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the Stewart-Carter proposal, which was relatively modest and based 
upon specific case law the authors felt warranted updating certain 
provisions of the Restatement, the Stephan-Cleveland proposal was 
broad in scope. They wrote that with the end of the Cold War and 
the advent of the Internet, we confront issues today that “either did 
not exist or were understood very differently at the time of the Third 
Restatement’s drafting.”30 These issues, in their view, include 
“terrorism, global warming, failed states, pandemics, international 
systemic risk in financial institutions, and digital reproduction of 
valuable information . . . .”31 Moreover, they argued that the old 
understandings about international law were about “managing 
potential conflicts between states,” rather than “organizing collective 
international responses to common problems,” and observed that 
questions of international law are more pervasive nowadays with the 
advent of globalization than they used to be.32 
The Stephan-Cleveland proposal suggested that a new 
Restatement could avoid plunging into “polarized debates” by 
breaking the work into small bits and pieces that could, over time, 
presumably replace the opus of 1986.33 The project was approved, 
and three areas of study and drafting were proposed for the first 
volley in this effort: “Domestic Effect of Treaties,” “Sovereign 
Immunity,” and “Jurisdiction.” 
What the Cleveland-Stephan proposal did not say, other than the 
oblique reference to “polarized debates,” was that foreign relations 
law—and particularly the constitutional doctrine that informs U.S. 
foreign relations law—has become highly contested and partisan in 
the past two decades. Since the 1990s, distinguished scholars have 
argued vociferously about the status and force of customary 
international law, treaties, and executive agreements as a matter of 
U.S. law. Recall, for example, the debate between Larry Tribe and 
Bruce Ackerman regarding the constitutionality (or not) of NAFTA, 
a congressional-executive agreement;34 and the revisionist view put 
forth by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith in Customary 
 
 30.  Id. at 1. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1–2. 
 34.  Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995). 
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International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, arguing that it was unconstitutional for the federal 
courts to consider customary international law as federal law because 
the Erie case forbade it.35 This latter assertion prompted forceful 
responses from Gerry Neuman,36 Bill Dodge,37 and Harold Koh,38 
among others.39 
Indeed, foreign affairs has become a polarized field, in which the split 
on the Supreme Court between so-called “liberal” and “conservative” 
Justices has played out in important cases such as Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,40 Medellín v. Texas,41 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.42 
Medellín was perhaps the most stunning of the three cases above-
cited, given that six members of the Court decided that the 
President of the United States could not order compliance with a 
decision of the International Court of Justice finding the United 
States in noncompliance of its international obligations under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations because of the non-self-
executing nature of the relevant treaties at issue (in the majority’s 
view). It continues to provoke scholarly debate,43 particularly given 
the somewhat opaque reasoning of the Supreme Court and the 
majority’s failure to adequately examine the self-executing nature of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the principal treaty at 
issue in the case.44 
 
 35.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); see also 
Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, 
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007). 
 36.  Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A 
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997). 
 37.  William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 
120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007). 
 38.  Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). 
 39.  For a good analysis of the debate about the status of Article II versus Article I 
treaties, see John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and 
International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 40.  542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 41.  552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 42.  133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 43.  See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (2008). 
 44.  Sloss, supra note 2. 
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Read against this background, the effort to restate U.S. foreign 
relations law, particularly as regards the status of treaties in U.S. law, 
seems somewhat naïve, as the law appears to most observers to be 
highly contested and in flux. The American Law Institute does not 
produce Restatements very often. In fact, there are no “Restatement 
Fourths” published in any field to date. Moreover, the decision to 
take up the question of “Treaties” is highly fraught, for, unlike 
questions of jurisdiction and immunities, for which there have been 
many cases, there are few recent decisions on the question of treaties, 
and the question of a treaty’s status as U.S. law raises profound 
questions of constitutional law and federalist concerns. Had the 
“project” been limited to consideration of jurisdiction and 
immunities it might have been less objectionable. Or, conversely, had 
it taken up new subjects in international law not well-addressed in 
the Restatement (Third), it would have had the advantage of 
providing clearer legal frameworks in some of the difficult areas of 
international law that have evolved since 1985. But it did neither. 
Instead, by taking on the status of treaties in U.S. law—particularly 
without regard to consideration of the status of customary 
international law, executive agreements and congressional-executive 
agreements at the same time—it ventured into one of the most 
fractious areas of U.S. foreign relations law. This seems problematic 
as a matter of process, and unlikely to lead to a positive result in 
terms of substance. 
II. TWO SPECIFIC CRITIQUES OF THE APRIL DISCUSSION DRAFT 
In reading the April Discussion Draft, one has the sense that it is 
an effort to take a few recent Supreme Court cases—such as 
Medellín—that have benefited the revisionist view and codify them 
quickly, rather than to comprehensively “restate” U.S. foreign 
relations law. Indeed, it leaves the reader completely at a loss 
regarding the status of customary international law and other forms 
of international agreements in the U.S. legal system, although 
presumably the Restatement (Third) would continue to apply to 
them. This is compounded by the fact that there is no stated 
explanation of why the reporters decided to separate the work on 
Article II treaties from all other forms of international agreements. It 
seems particularly odd given that the Restatement (Third) and the 
United States’ courts do not take this approach, meaning, in my 
view, that it is instead a policy preference of the reporters. 
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Recall that in the Restatement (Third), there were just a few 
black letter law provisions addressing “international agreements” 
which did not distinguish between Article II treaties and other 
international agreements. Section 111(1) of the Restatement 
(Third) provides: 
§ 111. International Law and Agreements as Law of the 
United States 
International law and international agreements of the United States 
are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the 
several States.45 
This provision aligns U.S. foreign relations practice with 
international law, because regardless of the domestic manner in 
which a State chooses to ratify its international agreements, they are 
all “treaties” internationally, governed by the rules of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and give rise to binding legal 
obligations on the international plane. 
Conversely, Section 101(1) of the proposed Restatement 
(Fourth) provides: 
§ 101. Treaties as Law of the United States 
(1) Treaties made under the authority of the United States are part 
of the supreme law of the land. 
(2) Cases arising under treaties fall within the judicial power of the 
federal courts, and treaties are binding on state judges. 
(3) Treaties create binding international legal obligations for the 
United States, and limitations on the domestic enforceability of 
treaties do not alter the United States’ obligation under 
international law to comply with relevant treaty provisions.46 
The comment to draft Section 101 states that “[u]nless 
otherwise indicated, the term ‘treaty’ in this Restatement concerns 
only ‘Article II treaties’—that is, international agreements entered 
into by the United States pursuant to the process specified in Article 
II of the Constitution.” What about other forms of international 
agreements? The comment states that they “will be addressed in 
 
 45.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 111 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 46.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 101 at 1 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015). 
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another Section of this Restatement.” This is an improvement over 
the prior draft, which was completely silent on this question, but 
since the ALI has not yet approved taking up any other sections, and 
the reporters have yet to produce a comprehensive outline of the 
proposed Restatement (Fourth), it is not clear how or when that 
might be accomplished. 
As it stands, however, draft Section 101 would not apply to 
NAFTA nor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the 
GATT)—two major international agreements adopted as executive 
agreements, not as Article II treaties. Presumably some other, as yet 
unwritten sections of the proposed Restatement will do so, and 
during the meeting that led to the papers in this volume, it was 
pointed out that many of the sections on Article II treaties could be 
applied to other forms of international agreements, mutatis 
mutandis, even though they have been deleted from draft Sections 
101(1) and (2). 
At the same time, this is not entirely reassuring. Congress has 
long treated the word “treaty” as meaning both executive 
agreements and Article II treaties, such as in the Tariff Act of 1897, 
which the Court recognized in B. Altman & Co. v. United States.47 
International law treats all kinds of agreements as “treaties,” and this 
has consistently been the case in federal courts as well. So why have 
the reporters taken a different view? Is it that they do not believe 
that non-Article II international agreements are within the ambit of 
the Supremacy Clause? Or have been unconstitutionally adopted? 
Why have they been eliminated from the scope of Section 101? The 
April Discussion Draft is silent, leaving one to speculate. This worry 
is not just a law professor’s hypothetical, but may have real-world 
implications. To take one recent example, the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action negotiated between Iran and China, the European 
Union, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, entered into in Vienna on July 14, 2015, has been 
attacked (including by an author in this symposium) as 
unconstitutional because it was not entered into with the advice and 
consent of the Senate as an “Article II” treaty.48 Other scholars have 
 
 47.  224 U.S. 583 (1912). 
 48.  Michael Ramsey, Is the Iran Deal Unconstitutional?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 15, 
2015), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/07/is-the-iran-deal-
unconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html. 
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disagreed, of course,49 and Hathaway herself has suggested that 
treaties can be adopted under either Article II or Article I, without 
regard to the subject matter at issue.50 Even assuming it to be 
constitutional as adopted, the drafters of the Restatement (Fourth) 
may be suggesting that it would not have the same status as U.S. law 
as it would have had if negotiated as an Article II treaty.51 For if it 
does not matter whether an international agreement is entered into 
using a process set forth in Article II rather than Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution, why limit Section 101’s scope and application? At the 
very least, this difficult question of politics, policies, constitutional 
law, and foreign affairs has been largely avoided heretofore by the 
courts. For the proposed Restatement to suggest that a black letter 
rule can be developed in this area seems to prove too much. 
Even if the omission of non-Article II treaties from Section 101 
was not intended to cast doubt upon their ultimate constitutionality 
or their status as “the supreme law of the land,” omitting them from 
the ambit of Section 101 casts doubt upon their status as such, given 
that the coordinating reporters have not published a complete 
program of work for the Restatement (Fourth). To complicate and 
confuse the effects of Article II treaties and international agreements 
domestically by segregating them out into different sections in this 
way seems odd given that the coordinating reporters have suggested 
that the overarching goal of the project is to help solve complex 
international problems. Indeed, the decision to separate Article II 
treaties from other forms of international agreements entered into by 
the United States seems likely to produce a fractured and complex 
product that will neither assist the non-specialist in the field nor 
 
 49.  See Julian Ku, Why the Iran Deal is Constitutional, But Could Still End up in U.S. 
Court, OPINIO JURIS (July 31, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/07/31/podcast-special-
why-the-iran-deal-is-constitutional-but-could-still-end-up-in-u-s-court/. 
 50.  Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L. J. 1236 (2008). 
 51.  They may not be suggesting this, but since they have offered no reason to depart 
from the unitary provision of Section 111 of the Third Restatement, we have to guess at why 
they have decided to sever out Article II treaties from other sources of international law. It is 
hard not to assume that it represents an intentional departure from what I call the Henkin 
“unitary model”—and it is worth noting that Henkin himself wrote that “it is now widely 
accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general 
use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty.” LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed. 1996) (footnote omitted). The Third 
Restatement also takes this view. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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promote the globalization agenda evoked by the coordinating 
reporters in the project description. 
As is well known, there have been thousands of executive 
agreements and congressional-executive agreements entered into 
since the founding. A study in 1997 found that between 1980 and 
1992, some 4510 new executive agreements were made against only 
218 treaties that received the advice and consent of the Senate.52 A 
more recent study reports that from 1980 to 2000 the United States 
made 2744 congressional-executive agreements and only 375 treaties 
(under Article II).53 They have also been treated by the federal courts 
as entirely interchangeable with Article II treaties, as shown by the 
Belmont,54 Pink,55 and Dames & Moore56 decisions.57 In American 
Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, the Court found that an executive 
agreement preempted contradictory state law.58 It has become 
understood that executive agreements are appropriate vehicles for 
entering into international agreements outside the mechanism of 
Article II as a result of long-accepted and unbroken practice.59 Of 
course, as noted earlier,60 one of the most difficult questions has 
been when it may be constitutionally required to use the Article II 
process, rather than another vehicle; the courts have refused to 
answer this question virtually every time it has been raised: where the 
case has proceeded to the merits, the court found the executive 
agreement to be valid.61 This is perhaps why the Restatement (Third) 
 
 52.  Detlev F. Vagts, International Agreements, the Senate and the Constitution, 36 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 145 (1997). 
 53.  Hathaway, supra note 50, at 1258–60. 
 54.  United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 55.  United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 56.  Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 57.  For a good discussion of the rise of the Executive Agreement as a source of “treaty” 
law in the United States, see Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 191 
(David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011). 
 58.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003). 
 59.  Dames, 453 U.S. at 657. 
 60.  See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 61.  E.g., Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Kan. 1977). On appeal, however, the 
Tenth Circuit did not address the merits and instead overturned the district court’s finding 
that the subject matter was not a non-justiciable controversy. Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109, 
1110–11 (10th Cir. 1977). 
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takes the view that they are interchangeable.62 Scholars, of course, 
have argued that the courts are wrong, as noted above. 
Because the courts have never distinguished Article II treaties 
from other forms of international agreements entered into by the 
United States, many—if not most—of the cases referred to in the 
comments or reporters’ notes to Preliminary Draft No. 3 involve 
international agreements which are not Article II treaties. For 
example, there are long citations to Reid v. Covert in the comment 
to draft Section 103, regarding the proposition that a treaty may not 
trump individual constitutional rights.63 It is the principal case cited; 
but as the reporters’ notes make clear, the international agreements 
at issue in Reid were executive agreements, not Article II treaties. If 
Reid is deleted from the commentary to proposed Section 103 of 
the Preliminary Draft, there is not much to “restate,” and the 
section becomes a great deal weaker. 
Section 104 of the Preliminary Draft is perhaps even more 
problematic: it says “Treaties” are supreme over state and local law, 
but it is silent about other international agreements (although cases 
involving other international agreements are cited, such as Pink and 
Garamendi, and the notes indicate that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has . . . applied the Supremacy Clause to displace the application of 
State and local laws that would conflict with sole executive 
agreements”).64 This suggests that the black letter text of Section 
104 should be changed. The comment to this Section, like the 
comment to Section 103, refers to the supremacy of executive 
agreements.65 Moreover, the reporters’ notes also refer to several 
cases involving not Article II treaties, but other international 
agreements, for the proposition that “treaty provisions” have been 
regularly enforced by state and lower federal courts over contrary 
state or local law.66 
In other words, one does not find a bifurcated world in the case 
law, in which Article II treaties stand clearly on one side of a 
 
 62.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 303 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., 1987). 
 63.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 103 cmt. c at 10 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014). 
 64.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 104 reporters’ note 1 at 18 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015). 
 65.  Id. § 104 cmt. c at 16 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)). 
 66.  Id. § 104 reporters’ note 1 at 17. 
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constitutional line subject to one regime and other international 
agreements stand clearly on the opposite side, subject to a different 
set of rules; rather, there is a unitary system of treatment of all 
international agreements under the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution. This is a felicitous result: under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,67 States are not required to 
investigate the constitutional processes involved in other States’ 
manifestations of consent to be bound on the international plane. 
III. THE GLOBALIZATION PROBLEM POSED BY THE 
PROPOSED RESTATEMENT 
I would like to conclude by returning to the transnationalist 
perspective evoked by the Stephan-Cleveland proposal. Recall that 
the premise of their project was that the world had changed since 
1985 and, therefore, we needed better tools to address international 
problems arising from globalization. My critique of the April 
Discussion Draft thus far has largely been that it misleads the reader 
regarding the status of international law in U.S. courts by creating an 
artificial distinction between Article II treaties and everything else. I 
have suggested an easy fix: return to the unitary formulation of the 
Restatement (Third). 
My second major critique is that the proposed deconstruction 
and partial reconstruction of the Restatement (Third) is simply too 
complex to achieve the objectives of the reporters. The most 
effective way to make international law enforceable is to domesticate 
it. National legal systems are much more robust than international 
courts and tribunals in their ability to enforce and apply international 
legal norms.68 To the extent that the proposed new Restatement 
makes it more difficult to incorporate and apply international law 
norms in U.S. courts, which seems likely to be its impact (if not its 
objective), it will arguably undercut the goals articulated in the 
proposal submitted to the American Law Institute, which was 
premised on the need for increased international cooperation and 
crisis management due to the pressures of globalization. 
 
 67.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331; see also Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 428–30 (Oct. 10). 
 68.  Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 
623 (1998). 
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The Preliminary Draft, by separating Article II treaties from 
everything else—customary international law and executive 
agreements—implicitly makes it more difficult, not less, to 
understand and therefore to use international law in the U.S. legal 
system. The audience for this Restatement is not just U.S. lawyers, 
judges, academics and diplomats, but foreign lawyers, judges, 
academics, and diplomats seeking to understand U.S. practice. The 
Restatement (Third) has been influential not only in the United 
States, but also abroad (as the Stephan-Cleveland proposal 
observes)69 and has often been cited by international courts and 
tribunals.70 Producing a confusing or tendentious Restatement 
(Fourth) could constrain, rather than promote, the ability of the 
United States to participate in international agreements to manage 
international problems. If a nation is unable to state clearly that its 
international commitments are binding and enforceable within its 
borders, it will be less, not more likely, to be able to negotiate 
effectively in international fora. 
 
 69.  Stephan-Cleveland Proposal, supra note 29, at 1. 
 70.  Australian Sec. Comm’n v Bank Leumi Le-Israel [1995] FCA 1744 [para. 126] 
(Austl.) (citing § 402(1)(c) of the Third Restatement to support the notion that prescriptive 
jurisdiction may be exercised, with respect to conduct outside the United States, if the conduct 
has a “substantial effect” within the United States); R v Truong, [2002] VSCA 27 [para. 74] 
(Austl.) (explaining that while the doctrine of specialty is not explicitly stated in an extradition 
treaty the court will imply that such a principle applies, following §477 of the Third 
Restatement); Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc. [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 39 (Can.) (finding 
that contempt orders should not be enforceable in Canada pursuant to the approach outlined 
in § 481 of the Third Restatement); R. v. Dorsay, 2003 BCSC 1934, para. 24, (Can. B.C.) 
(Third Restatement is an authoritative work in obtaining evidence in or for use in foreign 
state); R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No. 1), [2000] 1 
A.C. 61 (H.L.) [117] (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.) (endorsing the Third Restatement view 
regarding the relationship between human rights violations and the act of state doctrine); R v. 
Sec’y of State for Def. [2010] UKSC 29 [para. 167] (appeal taken from E.W.C.A. Civ.) (U.K.) 
(citing the Third Restatement when discussing jurisdiction in general international law); Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 51 (Van den 
Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (citing the Third Restatement on the question of jurisdiction); 
Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rev. 341, 
524 (2003) (relying upon the Third Restatement regarding a question of expropriation); 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award of 26 June 2000, para. 102 
(relying upon the Restatement regarding a question of compensation in considering whether a 
regulation may be considered an expropriation). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As the saying goes, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” and the first 
principle of any effort to undertake a Restatement (Fourth) of the 
Foreign Relations Law should be to do no harm. The April 
Discussion Draft on the status of Treaties violates both of these rules. 
Section 111 of the Restatement (Third) was clear and consistent with 
U.S. case law. Section 101 of the proposed Restatement (Fourth) is 
neither. As Section II, above, noted, the debate that accompanied 
the elaboration and publication of the Restatement (Third) was 
extensive and involved. Many government agencies weighed in with 
the ALI, requesting a comprehensive look at the entire proposed 
draft—as opposed to bits and pieces—and submitted extensive 
comments as well. The resulting product was a consensus document 
that has stood the test of time, and continues to be cited by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and international courts and tribunals. Admittedly, it 
does not address some of the contentious constitutional issues 
touched upon in the Discussion Draft for the Restatement (Fourth), 
leaving some of those difficult questions to resolution by the courts, 
and leaving some of the inter-branch debates to be resolved by the 
political and judicial processes over time, and in specific situations. 
The attempt to “restate” some of these difficult areas of 
constitutional law in the Discussion Draft seems both artificial 
and unhelpful. 
Of course, it is to be expected that any revision will provoke 
debate, and the debate itself is not a reason to shy away from the 
process of updating and revising if it is truly necessary. While there 
are not yet many comments posted to the ALI website concerning 
the Discussion Draft, it is starting to attract discussion—as this 
Symposium shows. Michael Mattler, Assistant Legal Adviser for 
Treaty Affairs with the U.S. Department of State, has already sent 
extensive comments to the reporters, expressing concerns with 
several of the proposed provisions, and debate amongst the 
participants in this symposium was extensive. It is clear that this part 
of the proposed Restatement (Fourth), on the status of treaties as 
U.S. law, is likely to continue to provoke active—and sometimes 
tendentious—discussions; and it is to be hoped that the reporters—
and the leadership of the ALI—will take note. As for this author, it is 
difficult to be supportive of this project as currently conceived. 
Proposing a chapter on the status of Article II treaties in U.S. law—
without mention of the other sources of international law—seems 
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illogical. Surely the first step in undertaking a major work, such as 
the drafting of a new Restatement, is to prepare a comprehensive 
outline of the proposed volume envisaged. It is inconceivable that 
the membership of the ALI—and other concerned constituencies—
could be expected to adopt, piecemeal, bits and pieces of a project 
whose final contours are yet unknown. One hopes that future drafts 
will include a proposed work plan, and set forth the rationale for 
proposing the structure adopted. For now, however, it looks like the 
reporters have simply decided to enter into the scholarly debate (and 
preferred one side of that debate) while minimizing the import of 
the case law. Hopefully, future revisions will correct this imbalance. 
Otherwise, this part of the Restatement (Fourth) project, at least, 
should be abandoned. 
 
